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Abstract 
 
Trade unions in the UK have traditionally followed a voluntarist strategy that has 
preferred collective bargaining and avoided the use of the law wherever possible.  
The exception to this has been in relation to the pursuit of equal pay between 
women and men.  The paper examines this apparent contradiction by examining 
the ways in which British trade unions have used the equality legislation in the past 
to secure equal pay through the courts.  The paper further considers recent 
legislative changes that, by adopting a reflexive approach, appeared to open up 
ways for equality bargaining to take place. Unfortunately the conclusion is not a 
positive one as political conservatism in relation to equality and judicial animosity 
towards trade unions has secured the status quo, ironically forcing trade unions to 
continue to use adversarial legal methods to pursue equal pay.    
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 Introduction 
 
It is not controversial to argue that trade unions in the UK have a chequered history in 
relation to equality. It is equally uncontroversial to point out the uncomfortable 
relationship that they have with the law.  However, quite interestingly, when these two 
problematic issues for trade unions are brought together, the picture seems more 
positive.  Some of the most important victories for equality in the UK have come about 
in relation to the trade unions’ influence on, and use of, the law.  Most of these victories 
have been in relation to the battle for equal pay for women.  Whilst pay is clearly a 
central issue for most trade union collective bargaining agendas, it does beg the 
question of why in the UK equal pay for women is often sought through legislative 
means.   It is also important to point out that recent events have served as a reminder 
that even equal pay legislation can have a powerful sting in the tail for trade unions.  
 
The aim of this paper is to explore these issues in greater detail.  It does so by firstly 
considering the impact that voluntarism may have made on the development of an 
equality agenda within UK trade unions and by assessing the arguments that they have 
thrown off their traditional mantle of voluntarism to embrace the law.  As part of this 
assessment the paper examines how UK trade unions have influenced and used equal 
pay legislation to good effect in the past, but also considers where case law has 
remained ‘trade union unfriendly’ and unhelpful in relation to collective bargaining on 
pay equality.  In doing so the analysis highlights the tension between the collective 
bargaining function of trade unions and the pursuit of equal pay for their women 
members.   Part of the problem lies in the individualistic nature of equal pay legislation 
and the paper considers recent developments in UK law that might help to collectivise 
equal pay issues, at least within the public sector.   
 
Voluntarism and equality – avoiding the law? 
 
Trade unions in the UK have historically had a problematic relationship with the law 
leading to Lord Wedderburn’s famous opening statement: ‘Most workers want nothing 
from the law than that it should leave them alone’ (1986: 1).  How far this statement did 
in fact reflect the views of most workers rather than the trade union movement is open 
to debate.  However it is widely considered that the historical mistrust of a class biased 
statute and judiciary led to the traditional stance of voluntarism within British trade 
unions (Griffith, 1981; McIlroy, 1995). 
 
In addition to their problematic relationship with the law, British trade unions have had 
an uneasy relationship with the concept of equality.  Historically they have protected 
differentials for their established white, male membership and have been slow to adopt 
the interests of workers who fell outside this description (e.g. Cockburn, 1983).  Whilst 
both voluntarism and the problematic nature of equality within trade unions are widely 
accepted, the two have rarely, if ever, been considered in conjunction.   Interestingly, a 
link has been drawn by historians between a voluntarist approach by US trade unions 
and their failure for many years to engage with civil rights issues (Rogin, 1962; Greene. 
1998; Robertson, 1999).  Robertson (1999) argues that the political stance taken by the 
American Federation of Labour (AFL) at the turn of the 20
th
 century was one of ‘radical 
voluntarism’ which sought to concentrate trade union effort only on activities that 
would lead directly to increases in pay.  Robertson argues that this strategy inevitably 
led to a severe narrowing of the bargaining agenda of the AFL.  At its height, radical 
voluntarism also entailed the AFL opposing the development of welfare policies such as 
state provided pensions and unemployment benefit in the belief that these provisions 
would weaken the ability of trade unions to increase wages by collective bargaining.  
Robertson argues that this strategy impacted most on the poorest and already 
marginalised workers in the US.  Citing Greene (1998), Robertson (1999:149) argues: 
“[AFL] leadership ensured a conservative labor strategy geared to white, male-
dominated craft unions… [which] steered the AFL down a path that benefited its 
members at the expense of women, blacks, new immigrants, socialists and industrial 
workers.”.  Robertson further argues that this strategy set the seeds of alienation from 
the trade union movement for the majority of American workers that is readily apparent 
today in the very low percentage of union membership despite the largest wealth gap in 
the world.  
 
Whilst British trade unions did not adopt the radical voluntarism described by the US 
labour historians, it is commonly held that voluntarism has dominated British trade 
union strategy and activity.  In his historical assessment of unions’ attitude to the law 
McIlroy (1995:234) states: ‘Reliance on the law could sap independence and pave the 
way for restrictive legislation.  If the state played too great a role in providing rights, 
workers may question the rationale for union membership’.  These arguments have 
some resonance with the arguments of the US historians in relation to voluntarism and 
the AFL.  Although the link has never been directly made in the UK case between 
voluntarism and a reduced input by trade unions to a wider civil rights movement, there 
is clear evidence that narrow bargaining agendas have impeded equality outcomes at the 
level of the workplace (e.g. Colling and Dickens, 1998; McBride 2001).  
 
Trade union politics clearly plays a role in decisions about if or how gender pay equality 
will be pursued, but there are other influences. The decentralised structure of collective 
bargaining in the UK has meant that, compared to most other European countries, 
collective agreements on pay have not extended beyond workplaces where union 
organisation is established (Whitehouse et al. 2001). This structural element has a 
particular impact on women workers who often work in un-unionised workplaces 
(Whitehouse, 1992; Howell, 1996; Rubery et al, 2005).  Howell (1996) argues that the 
limited impact of collective bargaining on pay equality in the UK increased the 
importance of the law, and particularly European equality law, for trade union activity 
on gender equality marking of the end of voluntarism.  
 
Whilst the effect of structural determinants in pay setting structure on equal pay in 
Europe have been widely studied (e.g. Whitehouse, 1992; Rubery and Fagan, 1994; 
Whitehouse et al. 2001; Blau and Kahn, 2003), differences in how trade unions and 
other groups might use the equality law have been explored by a limited number of 
comparative researchers (e.g. Harlow and Rawlings, 1992; Blom et al. 1995 cited in 
Alter and Vargas, 2000; Alter and Vargas, 2000).  Whilst it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to examine their findings in depth it is worth noting that the British example of 
pressure groups, including trade unions, using litigation to secure equal pay appears to 
be distinctive (Alter and Vargas, 2000). National structures remain a key issue and it is 
argued that the more embedded collective bargaining is within national pay setting 
frameworks, the less likely trade unions are to use equal pay litigation and might 
actively oppose legal intervention from other sources for fear that this strategy would 
undermine collectively negotiated agreements (Harlow and Rawlings, 1992; Blom et al. 
1995 cited in Alter and Vargas, 2000)
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.  This clearly has some resonance with 
arguments in favour of voluntarism.  
 
Internal trade union structures are also considered to be important. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, it is argued that trade unions with high female membership numbers are 
more likely to use the law to gain equal pay.  Trade union democracy and self-
organisation is also raised as an issue. The all female Danish Women Workers Union 
(KAD) is cited as an example where a litigation strategy has been particularly 
successful (Fitzpatrick et al. 1993 cited in Alter and Vargas, 2000:473).  However it 
would be difficult to separate these factors from issues of size and influence that might 
improve the chances of affecting change through collective bargaining rather than 
resorting to the law. 
 
 In the UK writers have identified an easier relationship with the law, suggesting that 
trade unions have moved into a post-voluntarist phase (e.g. Clough, 2007; Heery et 
al.2004; Howell, 2005).  This seems to have been particularly true in relation to the 
fight for equality but it could be argued that the traditional voluntarist stance taken by 
trade unions in relation to labour law did not apply in relation to equality legislation.  
McIlroy notes that voluntarism in the UK was always partial and contingent: 
 
By its emphasis on the procedures of collective bargaining and the value of legal 
abstention, voluntarism obscures questions of power and substance.  The kind of 
law that is available is a key issue.  The absence of one kind of law may help 
trade unions.  The absence of another may handicap them. (1995:236)  
 
Examples of this ambivalence are clear in trade union histories in relation to equality. 
Howell (1996) highlights that, because of the limited impact of collective bargaining on 
pay equality in the UK, the equal pay legislation became an important tool for trade 
unions in the period between 1979 and 1989, although ironically, the reduction in trade 
union power during this period and the consequent demise of collective bargaining 
coverage since then stemmed from restrictive legislative reform of industrial relations. 
Martinez-Lucio and Perrett (2009) make the same point in relation to race 
discrimination noting that equality legislation continued to develop as collective 
bargaining has declined since the 1980s.    Similarly  Howell (2005) describes the 1960s 
and 70s as the heyday of voluntarism in the British trade union movement, but it was 
just at this time that the women trade unionists at Ford were fighting for and winning 
equal pay legislation (Friedman and Meredeen, 1980).  
 
It seems that, in relation to equality, some of the reasons for the traditional mistrust of 
the law are less evident.  One reason for this might be pointed to by Howell (2005) who 
suggests firstly that the trade unions have always been willing to engage with protective 
employment legislation (as opposed to restrictive labour law) and secondly that the 
British state has played a far more active role in the shaping of industrial relations than 
the tradition of abstentionism suggests.  It could be argued that this is most clearly 
evident in relation to equality where the legislature has been the weapon of choice for 
both the state and the unions in the battle against discrimination. However the direction 
of causation is not clear. Does the state enact legislation to prevent discrimination at 
work because trade unions have failed to tackle it through collective bargaining or have 
trade unions used the law because the state has favoured a regulatory approach?  The 
following section considers some of the important milestones in trade union backed 
equality and equal pay cases
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 to develop the analysis. 
 
 
 
Trade unions and equality - using the law 
 
The events surrounding the Ford sewing machinists’ strike in 1968 were a defining 
moment for women in British industrial relations and for the development of equal pay 
legislation.  The dispute is documented in most detail in Friedman and Meredeen’s 
(1980) book and more latterly in the TUC’s “Winning Equal Pay” film documentaries.  
Interestingly, Friedman and Meredeen’s account indicates that the dispute started as a 
pay and grading issue between two groups of women sewing machinists at Ford’s 
Dagenham plant following job evaluation.  However, as the dispute progressed, it 
became clear that there were wider issues of comparison between men and women 
workers at the plant.  According to Friedman and Meredeen,  the trade unions involved 
ambivalently decided to pursue the dispute as an equal pay issue, particularly when the 
new
3
 Secretary for Employment and Productivity, Barbara Castle, took a personal 
interest in settling the dispute. 
 
Friedman and Meredeen’s account stresses how, at that time, internal trade union 
politics on a number of levels meant it was extremely sensitive to label the strike as an 
equal pay dispute rather than one of re-grading.  The women on strike at Dagenham 
were unequivocal that the dispute was about equal pay and they persuaded their male 
trade union convenor of this.  The national officials of some of the unions involved 
were more resistant to pursuing the dispute as an equal pay issue, as were union 
branches at the sister plant in Halewood.  Despite this ambivalence the strike was called 
off only after Castle brokered a settlement and agreed to table legislation on equal pay.  
These events suggest that the state stepped in because collective bargaining failed.   
Interestingly, the trade unions’ confidence in Castle was soured within 18 months when 
plans for another piece of legislation, contained in the controversial White Paper ‘In 
Place of Strife’, an early attempt to control trade unions, were unveiled,  further 
demonstrating the volatile relationship between trade unions, the State and the law. 
 
During this turbulent industrial relations period and amidst Parliamentary and some 
trade union opposition, the first Equal Pay Act was passed in 1970, although such was 
the extent of pay inequality, the legislation would not come into force until 1975.  What 
should be noted from this decisive period in equal pay and trade union history is that the 
Act, as it was passed, did not help the Ford women to achieve equal pay.  Theirs was 
essentially an equal value claim that could not be addressed by the 1970 Act.  In failing 
to address issues of gendered job segregation the law, as a solution, still lagged 
seriously behind the actuality of the problem.  Following the dispute and the legislation 
the Ford women machinists were still only paid 92% of the equivalent male rate.  It took 
sixteen years, another piece of legislation - the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations, 
and another strike in 1984 before the Ford women were re-graded to match the pay of 
semi-skilled male co-workers. 
 
McCrudden (1983) notes that pressure for the equal value legislation came from the 
trade unions, this time via the TUC. Citing the TUC Annual Report of 1976, 
McCrudden states: 
 
The TUC General Council during the consultation on the drafting of the 
Regulations pressed for a definition of equal value which would involve “the 
elimination of all discrimination from all aspects and conditions of employment 
which related either directly or indirectly to the sex of the worker concerned” 
(1983:209). 
McCrudden additionally notes that both the TUC and the EOC pressed for the 
Regulations to include the notion of a hypothetical comparator, something that has not 
been achieved and continued to be pressed for in the consultation on the Single Equality 
Bill in 2007
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 discussed below.  However, as if to illustrate the tensions that exist 
between the lobbying role and the collective bargaining role of the unions, McCrudden 
specifically notes the potential for differences in collective bargaining machinery to be 
used as a ‘material factor defence’.   
 
It was not long before these tensions were tested in the courts.  In a crucial early equal 
value case,   Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority
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, the employers did indeed use the 
different Whitley structures responsible for determining pay in the Health Service as a 
material defence for their lower pay to female dominated speech therapists’ roles 
compared to male dominated  pharmacists’ and clinical psychologists’ roles.  Rather 
ironically, whilst the employers were relying on discriminatory collective bargaining 
outcomes as a defence, the legal and financial support for Pamela Enderby’s ground 
breaking case came from the trade union movement. 
 
Fredman (1994) highlights how the British judiciary’s reluctance to interfere with 
collectively bargained pay rates thwarted Enderby’s case in the domestic courts.   By 
taking a very narrow definition of what constituted discrimination in relation to wage 
setting that failed to recognise institutional discrimination embedded in pay structures, 
the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) accepted the employer’s material factor 
defence.  In contrast, Fredman (ibid: 39) argues that “The ECJ [European Court of 
Justice] was far less concerned with the autonomy of wage setting and was therefore 
able to rely on a more incisive notion of discrimination” based on outcomes rather than 
process, meaning that separate collective bargaining structures as a material defence for 
pay inequality was ultimately rejected. 
 
The Enderby case is one example of a number of trade union backed cases that sought 
to make use of the equal pay legislation.  However there is much less evidence of trade 
union backed cases using either the Sex Discrimination Act or the Race Relations Act.  
It could be argued that using the law to directly improve pay is less removed from the 
ideals of voluntarism and therefore a more natural solution for trade unions.  One 
notable exception is Preston v Wolverhampton Healthcare Trust in which the Sex 
Discrimination Act, as well as the Equal Pay Act, was relied upon to challenge the 
exclusion of part-time workers, overwhelmingly women, from pension schemes.  But 
even here the approach - a number of unions combining to take 60,000 simultaneous 
cases to improve the pensions of their members has a clear resonance with at least the 
desired outcomes of voluntarism – collective strength to force employers to improve the 
terms and conditions of workers.  The difference here is that industrial action is replaced 
by the less predictable and cumbersome law as the lever to exert pressure on employers.   
   
Most of the problems for trade unions occur when they attempt to navigate the 
adversarial process of legislation that requires remedies to be taken via the courts rather 
than on their ‘home ground’ of the bargaining arena. Rights-based law can be used in 
collective bargaining  (Howell, 1996), but only as a threat that individual cases would 
be identified and employment tribunal cases taken if the employer does not remedy the 
situation via negotiation.   However, as with all threats, action is eventually required if 
they are not to lose their potency.  When this course of action has proved necessary 
identifying and taking cases is time consuming, difficult, expensive and unpredictable in 
terms of outcome for trade unions. Some of the leading cases such as Enderby took over 
ten years to settle. Even where negotiated settlements are achieved at the level of the 
workplace, the recent cases taken against trade unions (Allen and others v GMB) were 
made possible by the rights-based system, highlighting the unpredictability of legal 
outcomes for trade unions.  These cases have brought into question the role of trade 
unions in equality bargaining and are discussed further in the final section.   
 
It could be argued that both the law and the way in which trade unions are prepared to 
use it have become stuck in a particular mindset which, in part, attempts to recreate the 
traditions and values of voluntarism.   This mindset entails a narrow conception of 
equality and how it can be achieved underpinned by individualised, right-based 
legislation that has historically encouraged a cautious, reactive and essentially 
adversarial approach.  The following section examines arguments which have called for 
changes to the conceptualisation of equality law and the role of trade unions within it.  
 
 
Rethinking equality legislation and representation 
 
Calls for a review of the anti-discrimination legislation began to gain momentum in the 
UK following the change of government in 1997.  Some of the first press releases by the 
head of the newly formed EHRC, Trevor Philips, argued that the existing equality 
legislation, particularly the Equal Pay Act has ‘reached its sell-by-date’. In addition, 
legal and industrial relations scholars (e.g. Hepple et al, 2000; Dickens 1997, 2007) 
have lobbied for radical change to the equality legislation.  
 In an insightful paper Dickens (1997:285) argued: 
 
The current legislative approach in Britain centres on a predominantly private, 
individualised model of sex and race discriminations law concerned with formal 
equality (equality of treatment rather than outcomes).  The main requirement is 
to desist from doing negative things, there is no legal requirement to do anything 
to promote equality…” (emphasis as in original).   
 
Dickens goes on to argue for an articulated approach in which collective bargaining 
complements rather than contradicts equality legislation and where ‘unions can act as 
positive mediators of legislative equality frameworks and could be ‘written-in’ to more 
proactive legal measures…’ (ibid: 288).  
 
Hepple et al. (2000) call for a review of the equality legislation and provide 53 detailed 
recommendations on how change could be achieved. Their leading claim is that “the 
present framework places too much emphasis on state regulation and too little on the 
responsibility of organisations and individuals to generate change” (2000: xiii).  The 
recommendations for change included the public sector taking a lead via the 
introduction of positive duties to promote equality and for a process of negotiated 
change within organisations. 
 
The impetus to put some of these recommendations in to practice followed the Stephen 
Lawrence
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 inquiry, which uncovered serious institutionalised race discrimination in the 
Metropolitan Police Force.  Three new legal duties were placed on public authorities to 
address institutional discrimination.  Reflecting the seriousness of the Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry, the first of these duties, the Race Equality Duty, was introduced in 
2001 under the Race Relations (amendment) Act 2000.  The second duty to be 
introduced was the Disability Equality Duty in December 2006 as part of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 2005 and the final duty, the Gender Equality Duty came into force 
in April 2007 as part of the Equality Act 2006.  These separate equality duties were 
combined with five other equality strands to form a single Public Sector Equality Duty 
in the Equality Act 2010. 
 
The most important point to note about the Public Sector Equality Duties is that they 
were unlike any previous equality legislation in that they did not provide additional 
rights for individuals but rather placed responsibilities on public authorities.  In this 
respect they were considered to be a positive, proactive approach to equality which did 
not depend on discrimination having already taken place. They did not replace the 
existing equality legislation, which still provides legal remedies for individuals who 
have suffered discrimination.  Rather they sought to pre-empt legal cases by requiring 
public sector employers to anticipate and address potential sources of discrimination 
before cases emerged.  McCrudden (2007) refers to this change in approach as one of 
‘reflexive regulation’ where ‘[T]he trick… is for the legal system to construct a set of 
procedural stimuli that lead to the targeted subsystem adapting itself’ (p.259). 
 
To this end, the duties required authorities to have ‘due regard’ in all of their public 
functions to eliminate unlawful discrimination and harassment and to promote equality 
of opportunity.  In practice this approach was designed to ensure the mainstreaming of 
equality issues and to counter the past criticisms that equal opportunities were confined 
to specialist management functions and were not ‘owned’ by operational areas of public 
authorities (e.g. Jewson and Mason, 1986; Rees, 2005).  Another distinguishing factor 
was that the duties covered public authorities both as employers and as service 
providers. 
 
All of the duties adopted a similar format with a set of substantive ‘general duties’ 
placed on public authorities to eliminate unlawful discrimination and harassment and to 
promote equality of opportunity. Each equality duty also contained a set of more 
‘specific duties’ which were procedural requirements in relation to the disadvantaged 
groups covered in each of the pieces of legislation.  One of the requirements was that 
members of the disadvantaged groups should be consulted in various ways as 
‘stakeholders’. It is important to note at this point that the focus on participation 
increased with each successive equality duty.  In the Race Equality Duty the specific 
duties included an ‘expectation’ that groups affected by their policies and their 
provisions to meet the duty will be consulted.  There is a strong emphasis in the 
Disability Equality Duty on involvement of people with disabilities and there is an 
express requirement to do so in the specific duties.  However the focus is on direct 
participation rather than collective representation.  In the Gender Equality Duty the 
specific duties required that public authorities consult stakeholders, including trade 
unions, and to take into account their views in formulating gender equality objectives.  
These conceptual differences in the equality law provided an important opportunity for 
trade unions to strengthen the links between collective bargaining and equality that are 
considered in more detail in the following section. 
 
Using positive duties for equality bargaining 
 
The Public Sector Equality Duties offered an opportunity for trade unions to pre-empt 
the turbulent cycle of winning and losing inherent in a rights-based, adversarial 
regulation. The specific duties within Gender Equality Duty directly required that trade 
unions should be consulted.  Having provided a formalised route into the process of 
implementation, the different conceptualisation and format of the equality duties, 
particularly the Gender Equality Duty, offered the trade unions an opportunity to 
collectivise equality representation within and beyond collective bargaining without 
recourse to tribunal proceedings.  The divergence from an individualistic rights-based 
conceptualisation framed the process of collectivisation.  The duties, in essence, were 
about improving the situation for disadvantaged groups rather than individuals.    In 
addition the Gender Duty Code of Practice describes the Gender Equality Duty as a 
‘form of legally enforceable gender mainstreaming’ (p.7).  The mainstreaming approach 
coupled with an emphasis on participation, specific to trade unions in Gender Equality 
Duty, codified trade union input and involvement in all areas of equality policy and 
planning.  The duties were retrospective in that they covered past policies that may have 
embedded discrimination and required public authorities to consider how this may be 
redressed.   The equality duties therefore also offered the opportunity for trade unions to 
revisit policy areas where they previously have not been consulted on equality issues or 
simply may have ‘missed the boat’.   
 
The equality duties also covered, although in a more limited form, those public 
functions that had been contracted out to private or voluntary sector organizations.  This 
feature of the equality duties was particularly important to the public sector trade unions 
who found it increasingly difficult to represent their members working in contracted out 
services (Foster, 1993; Colling, 1995), many of whom are low paid women (Escott and 
Whitfield, 1995).  The specific duty to consult with trade unions in the Gender Equality 
Duty therefore made union exclusion more difficult to achieve. 
 
The Gender Equality Duty importantly offered another route by which the trade unions 
might have worked to close the gender pay gap in the public sector.  It required  public 
authorities to have due regard to the Equal Pay Act and to demonstrate how they had or 
intended to eliminate unlawful pay discrimination.  The Gender Equality Code of 
Practice (s3.41) states: 
 
These requirements, taken together with the specific duty to collect and make 
use of information on gender equality in the workforce and the duty to assess the 
impact of policies and practices, mean that listed public authorities have to 
undertake a process of determining whether their policies and practices are 
contributing to the causes of the gender pay gap.  This should be done in 
consultation with employees and others, including trade unions. 
 
The Code of Practice went on to provide detailed information and examples of the sort 
of actions that public authorities would need to undertake to comply with the duty and 
in doing so offered trade union activists some useful points of reference when seeking 
to negotiate on pay equality. 
 
Paradise Lost? 
 
The Public Sector Equality Duties were undoubtedly a break-through in the 
reconceptualisation of equality law in the UK but they did not address the limitations 
discussed above in relation to the equal pay legislation or the wider sex and race 
discrimination legislation flagged up by critics such as Dickens and Hepple.  The move 
to formalise more significant changes to the equality legislation appeared on the last 
page of the 2005 Labour Party Manifesto which included a pledge to introduce a Single 
Equality Act. Following their re-election to government the Discrimination Law Review 
was established in 2005 to work towards this goal.  In addition, the Equalities Review 
was commissioned by the government to provide an independent assessment. The remit 
of the Equalities Review was far broader than the legal focus of the Discrimination Law 
Review.  The stated aims of the review were to: 
 
 Provide an understanding of the long term and underlying causes of 
disadvantage that need to be addressed by public policy 
 Make practical recommendations on key policy priorities for: the Government 
and public sector; employers and trade unions; civic society and the voluntary 
sector 
 Inform both the modernisation of equality legislation, towards a Single Equality 
Act; and the development of the new Commission for Equality and Human 
Rights (Equalities Review 2007:13). 
 
The final report of the Equalities Review was published in February 2007.  In line with 
its remit the report was broad ranging recommending more integrated implementation 
strategies across equalities areas including the adoption of a single public sector 
equality duty.  It was therefore disappointing that the Discrimination Law Review 
consultation paper putting forward proposals for a Single Equality Act, released in June 
2007 (DLR, 2007), took an unambitious approach that sought to maintain the status quo 
in relation to older discrimination legislation.  
 
The Green Paper was silent in relation to some important principles established in the 
existing Public Sector Equality Duties such as involvement of stakeholders, the 
requirement to set equality objectives; the requirement for impact assessments and the 
duty to consult with trade unions significantly reducing the effectiveness of the new 
single public sector equality duty and the ability for trade unions to use them in a 
collective way.   In his analysis of the Green Paper consultation McCrudden (2007:258) 
notes ‘[t]here is little, if any, discussion of the role of collective bargaining (the term, 
for example is never mentioned), trade unions are seldom mentioned, and recent 
proposals to protect the results achieved as a result of such bargaining in the equal pay 
context is rejected…’   
 
Criticism of the Green Paper obviously elicited some concern on behalf of the 
Government.  The Single Equality Act was due to be announced in the Queen’s speech 
in November 2007 but was withdrawn until 2008.  The White Paper, The Equality Bill – 
Government Response to the Consultation was published on 21
st
 July 2008.  Despite the 
disappointment of Green paper the White paper contained some innovations to the 
equality legislation that would benefit trade union equality bargaining and 
representation. Firstly, there was support for the continued development of dedicated 
equality representatives whom are noted as having a crucial role in the enforcement of 
the Single Equality Bill.  The White Paper states ‘We will work with the trade unions to 
strengthen the excellent pioneering work of trade union equality representatives in the 
workplace’ (pg. 11). However the White Paper stopped short of providing the same 
statutory footing for equality representatives as provided to health and safety and 
learning representatives.  In addition there were provisions for a public sector socio-
economic duty which required public authorities ‘…to consider how their decisions 
might help to reduce the inequalities associated with socio-economic disadvantage’7.  
Other innovations included an extension to permitted positive action in the recruitment 
and selection of employees, allowing employers for the first time to make voluntary 
recruitment decisions based on protected characteristics where this would improve the 
representation of disadvantaged groups in the workplace.  The Act also contains 
provisions that would allow discrimination claims which combine two protected 
characteristics rather than making separate claims.  In relation to equal pay the Equality 
Act contains provisions for mandatory equal pay audits in workplaces with 250 or more 
employees. The data collected for equal pay audits would clearly be of significant use to 
trade unions in pursuing equality bargaining or equal pay claims through the courts and 
could provide an important bridge between collective and legal responses as envisaged 
by Dickens (1997).  
 
The passage of the Bill through parliament and the House of Lords was heavily 
contested by the Conservative Party, then in opposition.  For a while it was feared that it 
would not be passed before the 2010 general election and was at risk of being 
abandoned completely if the Conservatives won the general election.  The Equality Act 
finally made it on to the Statute books on the 8
th
 April 2010 – a month before the 
general election that did result in the current Conservative-Liberal coalition 
government.  It soon became clear that the passage of the Act was not completely held 
up by the Conservatives because much of its contents, certainly on any of the innovative 
aspects, are subject to secondary legislation.  Shortly after taking office the Coalition 
government announced that it would not introduce the secondary legislation required to 
take forward the provisions for a socio-economic duty, a combined discrimination 
provision or for mandatory equal pay audits meaning that much of the innovation 
contained in the Equality Act has been shelved.  In addition the specific duties for the 
public sector equality duty in England
8
 are more limited than those for its predecessor 
duties, having no direct provisions for equal pay or requirements to consult trade 
unions. The government is currently reviewing the future of the public sector equality 
duty, with the threat that it too may be repealed
9
. 
 
The Equality Act 2010 is something of a disappointment for those eager to see reform 
of equality legislation (see Hepple, 2011) and undoubtedly reduces the ability for trade 
unions to consult on equality issues, but perhaps the most worrying legal outcome for 
trade unions in relation to equality representation is the Court of Appeal ruling in  Allen 
and others v GMB
10
.  The case highlights quite dramatically the historical tension 
between the collective bargaining role of the trade unions and their relationship with 
equality law that is identified in earlier sections of this paper.  The case stems from a 
collective agreement in local government – the Single Status Agreement - which 
requires local authorities to harmonise the terms and conditions of their workforces.  In 
most authorities this has entailed job evaluation exercises that have uncovered historical 
equal pay discrepancies, which would require not only increases in future pay for large 
numbers of women but also substantial compensation for past discrimination.  In 
Middlesbrough Borough Council, where Mrs. Allen worked, the local collective 
agreement traded some of the back pay entitlements for pay protection for other (male) 
groups of workers.   Mrs Allen and other affected women claimed the union had acted 
in a way that had discriminated against them.  The Employment Tribunal rejected a 
claim of direct discrimination but upheld a claim of indirect discrimination and 
victimisation.  This judgement was overturned at the Employment Appeals Tribunal but 
reinstated by the Court of Appeal, which also refused the right of appeal to the House of 
Lords.   
 
Notwithstanding all of the very complicated legal issues that have been thrown up by 
this case, the outcome is that the trade union was left having to compensate women for 
the back pay that has accumulated as a result of the historical discriminatory pay 
practices of their employers.  The situation occurred precisely because the government 
had refused to fund the equal pay outcomes of the Single Status Agreement in local 
government, forcing trade unions and local government employers to negotiate 
settlements.   In short, one arm of the State (the judiciary) has forced the trade union to 
pay for the discriminatory behaviour of another arm of the State (local authorities), 
whilst the central executive of the State (the government) abdicated from any financial 
responsibility.   
 
The financial implications of this case could be as serious to trade union activity as the 
Taff Vale case that consolidated early union mistrust of the judiciary and the retreat into 
voluntarism in the UK. Some newspaper reports put a figure of £100m on the liability 
of outstanding cases (Wintour, 2008), which could severely impact on trade union 
funds.  The timing of the final ruling on the Allen case, within a few days of the release 
of the Equality Bill White Paper, was also portentous.  The Allen case threw into 
disarray the ability for UK trade unions to collectively bargain on equal pay issues, 
whilst the White Paper stressed their importance for the enforcement of equality in the 
workplace.  
 
The ruling in the Allen case has implications for the concept of equality bargaining 
(Colling and Dickens, 1989, 1998; Heery, 2006) as it reinforced the legal position that 
gender pay equality, once uncovered, is non-negotiable.  In doing so the ruling made 
bargained outcomes on equal pay risky for UK trade unions, perhaps forcing them down 
a legal route. Whilst it is clear that statutory rights to equal pay cannot be traded during 
collective bargaining, there is still an important role for trade unions to ensure that pay 
inequality is uncovered and acted upon using  collective  machinery where possible and 
the law where necessary.  Unison, one of the largest public sector trade unions, seems to 
have recovered some momentum in this direction after recently winning equal pay cases 
for almost 1000 women in a single local authority where collective bargaining had 
failed.  However, in a period of intense financial austerity in the UK public sector the 
cost of securing equal pay is likely to mean even tougher negotiations in relation to 
protecting jobs and public services, whilst the Allen case is a reminder to trade union of 
the limitations of collective bargaining. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to explore the relationship between trade unions and equality 
legislation in the UK.  Historically, the trade unions have had a problematic relationship 
with the law leading to what is commonly held to be a tradition of voluntarism.  Whilst 
their engagement with equality legislation has been more positive, there are historic and 
contemporary tensions between the collective bargaining functions of trade unions and 
their engagement with individualistic, rights based equality legislation. Voluntarism 
may have underpinned the narrowing of bargaining agendas to the detriment of equality 
priorities, particularly those unrelated to pay and benefits.  At the same time a changing 
membership and activist demographic has required engagement with the rights based 
legislation (Howell, 1996) with some successes but the drains on union resources have 
been high.  Moves to modernise equality legislation, substantively with the development 
of reflexive regulation in the form of Public Sector Equality Duties, appeared to 
alleviate some of these tensions and provide a more central and collective role for UK 
trade unions that need not depend on large-scale, adversarial legal intervention.  
However, as if to strike this initiative down before it had taken root, hopes for the 
development of progressive equality legislation have been halted by political 
conservatism and a disappointing suspension of some of the innovative provisions 
within the Equality Act 2010.   At the same time the historic animosity between the 
judiciary and the trade unions has surfaced within what appeared to be the safer waters 
of the equality legislation, ironically forcing UK trade unions to continue to pursue 
equal pay through the courts when collective bargaining fails.  
 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
 For example Harlow and Rawlings (1992) note that the leading European equal pay case, Defrenne v 
Sabena 1976, was vigorously opposed by the Belgian trade unions.  
2
 E.g. Hayward v Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd. [1988] QB12 (CA) 
Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] ECR1-5535 (ECJ) 
Preston v Wolverhampton Healthcare Trust [2000]ECR1-320 (ECJ)  
3
 Castle was appointed to the post in April 1968.  The strike took place in June of the same year. 
4
 Now the Equality Act 2010 
5
 The TUC “The Equal Pay Story: Scenes from a Turbulent History” provides a useful documentary of 
Pamela Enderby’s account of the case.  
6
 Stephen Lawrence was murdered following a racially motivated attack in 1993.  His murderers were 
sentenced 19 years later in January 2012. 
7
 Equality Act 2010 Part 1 clause1 
                                                                                                                                               
8
 The specific duties are subject to regional variation.  The Welsh Duties are much more detailed than 
those for England and include equal pay provisions. At the time of writing the Scottish parliament had not 
agreed specific duties. 
9
  See: http://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/in-the-public-sector/ [accessed 20
th
 December 
2012] 
10
 Allen and Others v GMB (2008) EWCA Civ 810 
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